Tag: judicial selection

North Dakota judges seek pay raise

North Dakota’s judiciary is seeking a 35% pay raise, phased in over two years. The state currently ranks 40th in judicial salary.

Many of the arguments are familiar: judges are already paid lower than many other state employees, they do not receive ordinary and consistent pay increases, and judicial work is difficult and sometimes isolating or dangerous. But proponents of the pay hike are advancing another, less common, argument: that a pay raise is needed to attract private litigators to the judiciary. Most applicants for judicial positions are prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers, for whom a judgeship represents a bump in salary as well as prestige. For successful civil litigators, by contrast, moving to the judiciary frequently involves a substantial pay cut, making the job less attractive.

An experientially diverse judiciary is essential for the administration of justice. And while raising salaries may not be enought to assure a proper experiential balance, it is indeed a meaningful consideration.

South Carolina faces internal dissent over its judicial selection process

New York is not the only state suffering though high-profile dysfunction with its judicial selection process. This week, the South Carolina legislature postponed its scheduled judicial elections, and several legislators as well as the governor called for changes to the state’s selection process.

South Carolina is one of only two states that chooses its judges by legislative election. Proponents of this approach have argued that it keeps judges more closely aligned with the values and sensibilities of the people. Opponents argue that it politicizes judicial selection (in that judicial candidates must win over legislators in order to secure their votes) and makes the judiciary subservient to the legislature. Indeed, many states moved to direct judicial elections in the nineteenth century because of concerns about legislative interference with the judicial process. Continue reading “South Carolina faces internal dissent over its judicial selection process”

Progressives win the LaSalle battle, but at what cost?

Last week, the progressives in New York’s General Assembly effectively killed the nomination of Justice Hector LaSalle to be the Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals. As I have documented previously, the opposition had nothing to do with LaSalle’s qualifications or experience, but rather a ginned-up power play over Governor Kathy Hochul. In doing so, they prevented LaSalle from becoming the first Hispanic Chief Judge of the high court.

Identity sure seems to matter to progressives — until it doesn’t.

More broadly, Albany’s progressives are joyfully gutting a coequal branch of government in order to engage in an intramural fight with the governor. The Court of Appeals, in need of a Chief Justice for months, remains without an administrative leader. And the entire state court system has been deprived of leadership with respect to their everyday work.

All New Yorkers should be outraged on this assault on their judiciary. The consequences will become evident soon enough.

New York’s Chief Judge resigns amid ethics probe

Janet DiFiore, the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, announced yesterday that she will resign effective August 31 of this year. Chief Judge DiFiore leaves with more than two years remaining on her term. She served not only as the chief of New York’s top court, but also as the chief administrator for the state’s sprawling (and often byzantine) court system.

The timing is certainly curious. DiFiore did not specify why she was leaving, other than to vaguely refer to “the next chapter in life.” Speculation is high that her resignation was influenced by a pending ethics probe, in which she is alleged to have attempted to influence a disciplinary action against a former court employee.

Governor Kathy Hochul will appoint DiFiore’s successor.

The disconnect between what Americans want in their judges and how they choose them

Professor Herbert Kritzer has a very interesting new article in Judicature, exploring the qualities Americans say they want in their state judges. It turns out that professional qualities like reputation for integrity and respect from leaders of the legal community are heavily desired, while political qualities like running for holding office or respect from party leaders is much less desired.

So then why do so many states still choose their judges through partisan, or at least politically influenced, elections? I offer a few thoughts at the IAALS Blog.

Colorado’s Chief Justice on court operations, judicial selection, and experiential diversity

The Colorado Springs Gazette has a terrific short interview with the state’s Chief Justice, Brian Boatright, on a wide variety of issues related to court operations and interdependence. Here is a taste:

[Q]: Is there any change during the COVID-19 era that you believe the Supreme Court couls permanently incorporate into its work post-pandemic?

Boatright: I believe that we will incorporate the practice of allowing attorneys to make oral argument remotely in certain circumstances. The pandemic has taught us that oral arguments can be efficient and effective wheh done virtually. I expect that attorneys who previously has to travel significant distances to present their arguments will want to take advantage of that option. Hopefully, that flexibility will reduce costs for their clients.

Chief Justice Boatright also discusses experiential diversity on the court, the role of collegiality, and the benefits of Colorado’s judicial selection system. It’s well worth a full read.

 

Rwanda ends recruitment exams for judges

The Rwandan government has changed its system for recuiting judges, ending the practice of requiring judicial candidates to pass specific recuitment exams. Instead, judges will now be political appointees. Under the lew legislation:

judges shall instead be appointed by the High Council of the Judiciary upon recommendation by the Bureau of the Judiciary.

They will be appointed based on their integrity, expertise and excellence they are known of in their career, and in their normal private life, other than gauging their capacity on their level of passing recruitment tests.

I don’t pretend to know enough about Rwanda’s political or judicial system to opine on the motivations for the change. But if a state that traditionally has employed a career judiciary –with testing and training up of young judges up front — suddenly moves to a system of politically appointing judges as a capstone to their legal careers, it’s certainly noteworthy.

Oh, Canada! Lawsuit alleges that country’s method of selecting federal judges is unconstitutional

The Canadian nonprofit Democracy Watch has filed a new lawsuit in federal court in Toronto, alleging that the country’s method of choosing federal judges violates the Canadian Constitution. Specifically, Democracy Watch claims that the process consolidates too much power in the hands of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, a single cabinet position which is politically appointed.

Under the current appointment process, provincial advisory committees (most of whose members are appointed by the justice minister) submit to the justice minister a list of candidates for each judicial opening. The justice minister then consults with other cabinet members and members of Parliament from the governing party. After consultation, the justice minister has the final choice for appointment.

This certainly sounds like the justice minister has enormous leverage, especially since there is no obligation to consult with opposing parties or to seek out views from outside the minister’s inner circle. In this respect, the process may preclude outstanding candidates from being considered, and therefore may have an effect on the overall quality of the judiciary. Whether this is truly a constitutional problem or merely a policy one, I cannot say. But the case will be worth following, both for the ultimate result and for how Canadian federal judges address delicate questions regarding the constitutionality of their own appointments.

On Biden, the Court, and what voters “deserve to know”

Joe Biden’s refusal last week to state whether he supports the Court-packing scheme advanced by several prominent members of his own party, and his insistence that voters “don’t deserve” to know where he stands on the issue, has drawn understandable scrutiny. Several commentators have attempted to dissect both the political cynicism behind the proposal and Biden’s strategy for declining to comment on it. (In particular, I recommend the first dozen minutes of this Commentary podcast as well as this op-ed by Gerard Baker in the Wall Street Journal).

I want to focus here on what the kerfuffle means for Biden post-election, since it seems very likely that he will win the Presidency next month. As Baker points out (behind a paywall, unfortunately), “even Mr. Biden—something of a procedural conservative—must be aware how grotesque the idea [of court packing] is. The prospect of a high court turned into an adjunct of the executive and legislative branches, staffed by black-gowned, forelock-tugging accessories to untrammeled political excess, must surely give him pause.”

Baker is right. Biden is too steeped in the Washington politics of the last fifty years to not be a traditionalist on this issue. Indeed, he has had three decades to reveal himself as a disruptor of court structure, both as a high-ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and as Vice-President. To be sure, he has spearheaded legislation that has changed court operations, and he bears heavy responsibility for setting the tone of current Supreme Court confirmations with his behavior during the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. But he has nevertheless conducted himself according to the standards of twentieth-century American politics: play hard, and don’t kick the game board over just because you think you’re losing.

The extremists in his party disagree, and are embracing the vision of converting the Court into an arm of the progressive movement by brute political force. This  development should concern all who believe in preserving the delicate balance between court independence and interdependence, and indeed the proposal is playing very poorly with most voters. (Perhaps in a nod to this reality, Biden himself finally stated that he was “not a fan” of court packing in a radio interview on Monday.)

Progressive extremists will certainly put pressure on a Biden Administration to force the court-packing policy into existence, especially if Democrats win the Senate in November.  And of course Biden, like any President, would feel some compulsion to support the legislative agenda from a same-party Congress. But some of the more senior legislative members of his own party recognize the inherent dangers (political and structural) of court-packing, and would likely try to to slow down any movement, especially in the Senate. Moreover, there is no significant reason to believe that his White House would simply be a vessel for extreme progressives. Biden is a wily veteran in Washington. No matter how he may project on the camoaign trail, he surely knows how to wield the levers of power behind closed doors.

Bottom line: A Biden Administration will not support court packing and will try to deemphasize it. Look for Biden to lean on Nancy Pelosi, and others who have been burned by aligning themselves with their intraparty radicals, for assistance in tamping down the extremism. Biden’s position may prove to be a last stand, depending on the growth of the radical progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and court-packing may remain as an issue in 2024. But a lot will happen between now and then, and the short-term likelihood of this terrible policy proposal coming to fruition is probably slimmer than it appears.

An interesting overview of the Japanese judiciary

I am no expert in the Japanese legal system, but I was intrigued by this article (in translation, from Nippon.com) which sets out some of the history and mechanics of the country’s judicial system. In particular, I was struck by how strongly the modern judiciary has been influenced by American occupation after World War II, both positively (adoption of the political question doctrine, overt commitment to judicial independence) and less positively (e.g., direct American interference in high profile cases in the immediate postwar years). I was similarly struck by the Japan’s embrace of bureaucratic approach to judging that is common in civil law systems across Europe and Latin America.

A good, relatively short read.