Five reasons why the federal judiciary’s proposed ban on Federalist Society affiliation is a terrible idea

The Wall Street Journal reports today (through a staff editorial) that the Judicial Conference of the United States is considering banning federal judges from affiliating with either the libertarian/conservative leaning Federalist Society or its left-leaning counterpart, the American Constitution Society (ACS). The proposed ban comes out of one of the Judicial Conference committees, the Committee on Codes of Conduct, which addresses issues of federal judicial ethics.

According to the editorial, the current draft of the proposal states, in part:

“In sum, the Committee advises that formal affiliation with the ACS or the Federalist Society, whether as a member or in a leadership role, is inconsistent with Canons 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the Code [of Conduct for United States Judges]…”

“Official affiliation with either organization could convey to a reasonable person that the affiliated judge endorses the views and particular ideological perspectives advocated by the organization; call into question the affiliated judge’s impartiality on subjects as to which the organization has taken a position; and generally frustrate the public’s trust in the integrity and independence of the judiciary.”

Given the ongoing efforts of both major political parties to politicize the judiciary, it’s not hard to see why the Committee is sensitive to the organizational affiliations of its judges. But this idea (assuming it is being correctly reported) is both impractical and unwarranted, for at least five reasons. Continue reading “Five reasons why the federal judiciary’s proposed ban on Federalist Society affiliation is a terrible idea”

Seeking a more muscular judiciary

I have a new op-ed up at The Hill, urging the judiciary to be more outspoken about the rule of law and the role of courts in our society. A snippet:

The courts today could use a healthy dose of [John Jay’s] swashbuckling spirit. They are uniquely situated to reaffirm our core legal values in the public sphere, and to reassert their position as an equal branch of government. This is not to say that the courts should willingly inject themselves into partisan debates. Not every political exercise is a partisan one, however, and the courts are well within their institutional role to remind the other branches, the media, and the public of our shared and cherished legal tradition, and to take appropriate measures to ensure it remains intact.

Please read the whole thing!

When “liking” a Facebook post is cause for judicial disqualification

At the IAALS Blog, Maddie Hosack relates the story of a Kentucky judge who was disqualified from presiding over a lawsuit involving the state’s Republican governor, after it was discovered that the judge had liked a Facebook post featuring the governor’s Democratic challenger in the upcoming election. It’s another reminder that judges must be extraordinarily cautious in their use of social media.

 

California may allow judges to speak publicly about their decisions

The California Supreme Court is weighing a new ethics rule that would permit the state’s judges to speak publicly on any court ruling if it becomes an issue in an election or recall campaign. The San Diego Union-Tribune explains:

The move to amend the Judicial Code of Ethics would allow any judge, not just the jurist involved in a campaign, to comment on “the procedural, factual or legal basis of a decision about which the judge has been criticized during the election or recall campaign,” according to a draft of the proposed rule.

Historically, judges don’t comment on pending cases out of concern it could show a bias to one side or the other, impair the rights to a fair trial or influence how a case develops. The current ethics rules ban judges, and their staff, from making any comment on pending cases.

The decision is spurred by last year’s ugly and successful campaign to recall state judge Aaron Persky, whose extraordinarily light sentence of admitted rapist Brock Turner galvanized a movement to remove him from the bench. Existing ethics rules prevented Persky–or any other judge–from speaking about his decision.  If a new rule is implemented, it would go into effect on April 1.

In a widely criticized move, New York Governor prevents Trump-appointed judges from performing weddings

The New York Post reports on the move here. This is really sad and petty, designed only to make an ill-advised political point.

In New York, all state judges are allowed to perform weddings, as well as all legislators and the governor himself. A new law would have extended that power to all federal judges in the state, and passed overwhelmingly in the state legislature. Read the whole thing to see the criticism of the move coming from all sides.

The Trump Records Requests and the Potential for Judicial Intrusion into the Legislative Process

A guest post by Lawrence Friedman

Few observers could have been surprised by the federal appeals court’s decision in Trump v. Mazars USA, concluding that President Donald Trump cannot stop his accounting firm from producing financial information about him in response to a subpoena from the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. In fact, Trump has lost every case in which access to his personal financial records has been sought. The Supreme Court has agreed to review these decisions, with oral argument scheduled for March, and the Mazars USA case may prove the most intriguing—especially to those justices who prefer an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.

The majority in Mazars USA validated the House Committee’s rationale for the subpoena to Trump’s accountants: the information about the president’s finances was necessary to further Congress’s legitimate legislative objectives. It is well settled that congressional committees may investigate matters upon which Congress can legislate. Through investigation, Congress may determine whether existing laws are sufficient, and whether they are being adequately enforced. The results of an investigation may persuade Congress to strengthen or modify existing laws—or propose new regulatory requirements. The request of Trump’s accounting firm, for example, related to the congressional interest in the efficacy of existing financial disclosure laws.

Given that the power to investigate is, as the Supreme Court has put it, “inherent in the legislative process,” courts generally have deferred to Congress’s stated rationale for seeking certain information in connection with a particular inquiry. Indeed, Congress enjoys relatively wide discretion to decide how best to go about the business of lawmaking. Such judicial deference appropriately leaves the democratic process to serve as the check on the legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of its investigative and policymaking authority.

These principles suggest the majority in Mazars USA made the right call in respect to the information held by Trump’s accountants, but Judge Neomi Rao’s dissenting opinion is still noteworthy. Relying upon text, history and the views of the framers, Rao sees a defined and judicially enforceable line: when a congressional inquiry touches on potential presidential wrongdoing, she reasons, “it does not matter whether the investigation also has a legislative purpose,” because “[a]llegations that an impeachable official acted unlawfully must be pursued through impeachment.” Rao accordingly would have held that investigations that turn on potential criminal conduct by the president or executive branch officials can only be pursued through the impeachment process.

Rao views a strict separation between legislative and impeachment authority as necessary to ensure that the House of Representatives does not escape the accountability associated with an impeachment inquiry. It is not entirely clear why the people would be more likely to hold House members accountable for the decision to undertake an impeachment inquiry as opposed to purely legislative investigation. After all, regardless of the House’s ends, its members serve the smallest number of constituents, hold office for the shortest terms of any elected federal official and, as a result, are the most responsive to the will of the people—which is true no matter the substance of any action the House undertakes.

Nonetheless, Rao’s originalist approach might well attract the attention of justices like Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. Were a majority of the Supreme Court to embrace her categorical division between legislative and impeachment investigations, Congress would face practical questions about how to exercise its lawmaking authority. On the one hand, House majorities could continue to pursue legislative investigations, and when they uncover evidence of illegal conduct by executive branch officials, the investigations could be reconstituted as impeachment inquiries. On the other, House majorities could decide to make impeachment the default mode of congressional investigation, regardless where it might lead—which could see the House operating in impeachment mode pretty much all the time.

In the end, no matter the label attached to the way in which the House chooses to pursue its constitutional lawmaking functions, the structural incentives for members of the majority to respond to constituent demands would remain unchanged. House investigations might proceed under different headings, but the questions – and the goals –in most instances would look quite familiar.

Through it all, moreover, Rao’s framework would appear to contemplate the courts policing the line between legislative and impeachment investigations. Judges, in other words, could be reviewing how duly elected members of Congress choose to go about pursuing their official responsibilities. To borrow Chief Justice John Roberts’s favorite analogy, such an approach could empower judicial umpires to go beyond simply calling balls and strikes and, instead, second-guess a manager’s strategic choices. Perhaps needless to say, such a development risks potentially dangerous judicial intrusion into the functioning of a coordinate branch of government.